The Iran Expert Trump Fired

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FP Live Introduction

0:30Hi, I'm Ravi Agrawal, Foreign Policy's Editor-in-Chief. This is FP Live.

0:41Iran and the United States are locked in a familiar pattern.

0:47Conflict has resumed. Both sides are slowly escalating and widening the scope of their attacks. And energy prices are rising. What would it take to bring Tehran and Washington back to the table? What do they both see as acceptable outcomes to this war? My guest this week is a Middle East and Iran expert who could have been advising the Trump administration if he hadn't been forced out last year. Instead, he speaks out on FP Live. That is coming up.

Gen Z Protest in India

1:18First, I wanted to draw your attention to a Gen Z protest that is gaining momentum in India, the world's most populous country. Here is my read on things. On Monday, thousands of demonstrators, mostly young people and students, hit the streets of New Delhi. They call themselves the Cockroach Janata Party, a dig at Prime Minister Narendra Modi's ruling BJP or Bharatiya Janata Party. The name stems from a comment made by the country's chief justice in May, who compared India's unemployed youth to cockroaches.

1:54A young Indian who had just graduated from a university program in the United States turned to social media to jokingly call for all the cockroaches to join hands. And join they did. The Cockroach Party quickly gained more than 20 million followers on Instagram. The protesters cleverly focused on just one thing, the fact that the test for the country's medical entrance examinations last May was leaked. Two million students take that exam every year for just over 100,000 seats at medical schools across the country.

2:28It is a brutal test. And the idea that someone with money or connections could get the questions ahead of time has enraged millions of students and their families. The protesters are now demanding the education minister resign, among other things.

India's Problems

2:45India's problems with education and unemployment are real. But it's anyone's guess as to whether this protest will turn into something bigger, or indeed a serious challenge to Modi, who is effectively the world's most popular leader, and whose party recently won a spate of state-level elections. It is also premature, I think, to tie these Gen Z protests to other such movements around the world recently, from Nepal to Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

3:16The specific cause of each protest seems to be different. They've also had different outcomes. Every generation has its protests. I don't think Gen Z is new in that sense. Nor is Gen Z a term that translates across cultures or countries. But having made all of those caveats, however, let me stretch and draw a line through these movements.

Global Youth Challenges

3:43Young people all over the world today have gone through challenges that truly are global. The Great Recession at the start of this century, which wrecked jobs for a generation. The COVID pandemic, which robbed students of key years on campuses. And then there's AI more recently, threatening to perform the tasks that many entry-level workers do. All of that amid a global trend of high inflation and inequality. When it comes to protest, one thing that connects all of this is the smartphone.

4:17Young people everywhere now have not only local but global peers to compare themselves with. This makes perceptions of injustice especially powerful. Meanwhile, governments everywhere used to have much more control over what people could read and see. Even in India, the country's TV channels were slow to cover the protests. So the Cockroach Party was born online. And it grew online. And that's why Delhi briefly shut down the internet. And that's also why more repressive countries like Iran, North Korea, or even China have taken more draconian steps to control the web even more.

4:54The internet is the new battleground for people power. But ultimately, protests can't survive just online. They have to navigate the physical world and all of its complexities and trade-offs. My guess is that Modi's BJP is betting that the protests will peter out amid the summer heat. That is the battle of wills. India's Gen Z will have to believe that they can win.

Iran Conflict Interview

5:23Okay, on to this week's featured interview on the Iran conflict. As of this taping, on Monday, the 20th of July, the Houthis, an Iran-backed armed group in Yemen, have threatened to block Saudi ships from passing through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the southern portal to the Red Sea. If that goes ahead, you can expect the global fuel crisis to get much worse. But we're also hearing reports of diplomatic talks restarting. Either way, my guest has a lot of experience dealing with key players in this conflict.

5:57Nate Swanson was a career State Department official focused on the Middle East. Under President Biden, he was director for Iran at the National Security Council. And in the Trump administration's second term, he was part of the Iran negotiating team. He was forced out of that role last year. Let's dive in.

6:20Nate, welcome to FP Live. Thank you for having me. So, Nate, take us back to when we had a memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States. We can all agree that that was a flawed document, but it stopped the fighting. I want to understand how we got from there to here. What happened? Sure, thanks. I mean, it's a great question. But if I can, I'm just going to briefly start at the beginning of the war, because I think the same mindset applies both to what's going on now as it did right when the war started.

6:51Right. So when the war started, I think, you know, the United States and Iran had very clear objectives going on. And it's kind of contradictory. Right. So I think from the United States perspective, you know, they were coming off a high. Right. You'd had Maduro operation just, you know, a few weeks before you had the 12 day war the June before. And you really just had these series of U.S. engagements that have been highly successful and kind of high risk, you know, high reward operations with no consequences. So I think the U.S. came into this war knowing that some form of Iran-Israel war was going to be inevitable and just believing that this is going to be easy and effective.

7:27Right. And so this was really this principle going in. And so, you know, the negotiations before the war were really, you know, from the U.S. perspective, kind of surrender talks. Right. Iran, to avoid a war, Iran basically needed to surrender. And then for Iran, this was existential. And this was, you know, unprecedented pressure they're facing. You know, they've been attacked, you know, three times by Israel in the past year and a half. And there is this looming prospect of attacks every six months in perpetuity, in addition to economic and environmental problems that are like existential as well.

7:57So for them, the regime was on the hook. So, you know, that led to, you know, 40 days of fighting and, you know, however, 70 days of a ceasefire. And you eventually got to, as you said, this very flawed MOU. But it was kind of the best case scenario because the war had proven that you were basically in a stalemate and it was diminishing returns. So the document was flawed, but it beat the alternative. And so what's happened, though, I think from that from that moment of the MOU being signed to where we are now is that both sides kind of view the document as a surrender.

8:32Now, the problem is each side thinks the other is surrendering. You know, the U.S., with all of its overwhelming military strength, believes that Iran should ultimately capitulate to their demands, whereas Iran feels like they won the war. You know, they have the straight-up moods. They have this new leverage they didn't have before. They put, you know, tangible costs on the U.S. and more importantly, on the global economy. And they feel like they won. So they feel like the U.S. should be surrendering. So these mindsets coming into the talks were, you know, very different, and I think we're looking past each other. And so you add those two components with just a very weakly, ambiguously framed document, and this was inevitable.

9:08It was too volatile to say. After the MOU was signed, you wrote that while Trump lost the war, Tehran might overplay its hand and then lose the peace that follows. Can you explain that a little bit? So in what way are you saying that Tehran overplayed its hand, especially when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz? And that leads us to how we went from the MOU to this point right now. Right. So essentially, I think for there to be any sustainable peace from Iran, you have to have two very low common denominator things, right?

9:42You need the strait to be open and flowing because absent that, it doesn't work for the U.S. or the world, right? I mean, you can't have 20 percent of the world's oil and energy cut off. You can't walk away from this. You have to resolve the strait. And I think you have to have this bare minimum level of confidence that they're not pursuing a nuclear weapon. So absent those two things, you know, you're just going to have some form of conflict come up again. And so my worry with the MOU in particular is that it resolved none of these issues, right?

10:13And so it didn't even resolve the the strait issue. And so you could read it as as played out is like both sides could read it how they wanted. The U.S. said, you know, be the free flow of energy and Iran thought they had control. And the problem is those two things don't really work. So you had an MOU that was not really ready for primetime. You know, I mean, the U.S. pushed the timing of this, but didn't get actually get any substance. And so unless Iran was going to over comply with the terms of the deal, something like this was inevitable.

10:45Just let's linger on that for a little bit longer, because here's the thing I don't fully get. So when we were at the height of the war and then the ceasefire after this is before the deal, the global economy was really suffering, I mean, mostly Asia, but also, you know, the Middle East and ultimately the United States, which, of course, had higher inflation. People were paying a higher price at the pump, et cetera, et cetera. But Iran was also suffering deeply. And so what I'm getting at here is despite the clear economic pain on both sides,

11:19there was still a feeling that we still need to assert whatever it is that we need to assert. And in Iran's case, it needed to assert control of the Strait of Hormuz and then take on a lot more pain because of that. Is that right? Yeah. I mean, as you allude to, right, the strait is a new dynamic, right? This this was theoretical before. It's realistic now. So I think Iran could could use this newfound tool in like one of two manners, right?

11:50They could either use it as basically, in my mind, to view it as a form of deterrence, right? Because what U.S. president is going to ever approach a war a way that Trump approached this one? The idea that it'd be easy, be quick, cost free. I mean, so that that is done, right? So I think if Iran had wanted to, the Strait could have been, you know, used as a deterrent for future attacks, which would have been a major victory for Iran. I think the problem, though, is that Iran has not done that. They have been trying to use it to basically extort more money out of it, right? Through either through tolls or fees or who knows other schemes are coming up with.

12:25And the problem with that is that, you know, it makes it easier to go back to war. So they sacrifice their security for economics. And underpinning this, and to your point directly, is Iran also wants the political victory that comes with it, right? They want to be able to say, we now control the Strait in ways that we didn't before. And so I think that's not great, certainly from a U.S. perspective or from an international perspective. But there's probably ways you could have made it work if it was a rhetorical thing only.

12:57But the moment you put tolls or fees in, I think, you know, you have precedent issues. You know, we only have, you know, seven or eight Straits like this in the world. And if you have a similar model elsewhere, it's not sustainable. So I think there was a way that this could have been done to give Iran a rhetorical victory and then give him this, you know, basically a security guarantee almost. But they instead kind of went for everything. And that's made it too volatile to last. And I think at least part of it could be because Iran wasn't in a place where it could trust an American-backed security guarantee, you know, and to some degree that makes sense.

13:34But just strategically, how long can Iran continue to use the Strait as leverage in this manner before weakening its own hand? Because countries and companies are going to seek other routes and other means to get their stuff out there. Yeah, you're right. I mean, it is a diminishing asset because, as you said, right, that there are already workarounds being done, right, to try to build infrastructure that bypasses the Strait or, you know, seeks alternate routes.

14:04But that's really time consuming, right? This is going to be, you know, three, five, ten year projects. And so while I do think that's happening and should happen, you know, it really, I think, would have been in Iran's interest to get traffic back up to peak levels to like to disincentivize that being done because it's just so much cheaper to go through the Strait. And so, you know, they didn't do that, you know, for some understandable reasons. You know, it wasn't completely irrational, but they took a short term approach as opposed to a medium or long term approach. And that will weaken their leverage over a longer period of time, but it's not going to be immediate.

14:39There's this general sense that the White House doesn't have great options to stop Theron from controlling the Strait right now. And that's partly why now there's renewed chatter in D.C. about potentially escalating this to the point of a ground invasion or pushing for regime change in some form. How seriously are you taking that kind of talk right now? Seriously, and you can feel it building around you, right, both in what's online, but as you talk to people, there is this perception in D.C. here.

15:17A lot of people didn't like the MOU, right, for understandable reasons, right? It gave Iran a lot of benefit and the U.S. got none up front. And so now that it's kind of collapsed, I've heard from really a number of people say, well, we just need to then double down on the military option. We need to do a ground invasion. We need to continue, you know, airstrikes, something like that. So I think we need to take it seriously. Right. And I think that's maybe not why the president's doing what he's doing right now. My view is this is more for leverage. But if you're really being honest with yourself, I don't see how, you know, a half-hearted military campaign really changes Iranian decision-making calculus.

15:58So I think if you're really being honest with yourself, the only thing that would actually lead to a regime change or a significant change in Iran's approach is basically, you know, a massive ground campaign that is aimed at regime change. Kind of a la 2003 Iraq. Now, look, I mean, I think that would be a disaster and I would advocate against that. But if you're being honest with yourself, I don't see how these half campaigns where, you know, we do these aerial campaigns, we think it'll change Iran's calculus. It hasn't. And I guess it's hypothetically possible that the blockade could at some point.

16:30But we just gave them, you know, a pretty significant chunk of oil sales in the short time the MOU is in effect. And even then, they've proven they were still probably months and months away from actually feeling so much pressure that they would capitulate. And I think ultimately time is kind of on their side, right? I mean, it's basically a race, you know, a test of wills to see who is willing to endure more for a longer period. And I just, you know, from an American perspective, don't see how we think it's in our interest to, you know, sacrifice American lives, sacrifice our economy for real, no clear strategic upside.

17:08So I know not everyone agrees with that. And obviously, I'm not going to defend the regime at all. They've done some horrible things. And I think we would all be better off if there was, you know, significant change in the way they acted or who is composed of the regime. But it's a really high price to pay without a clear payout. Wow. In your last couple of roles in government, and I should stress, you've had a long career in a bipartisan manner advising both Democratic and Republican administrations working on issues for American interests.

17:39But, you know, you were ousted from your last role in which you were part of the Iran negotiating team. Who is currently advising the White House, the president on key issues regarding Iran? Yeah. So I'll caveat this with this. I've been out of government for a year, right? So it's changed in ways that I'm probably unaware of. But when I was there, I would just say it was kind of a unique structure. I think, you know, I started at the tail end of the Bush administration and went through Obama, Trump one, Biden, Trump two.

18:14And it was kind of a uniquely top-down enterprise. The president, I think, is more involved in day-to-day decision making than I've ever really seen on any other issue, and especially as it was related to Iran. I mean, we went to war because he thought it was in his best interest. And I think if you look at the reporting surrounding this, you know, it was clear that some of the cabinet secretaries had hesitations about this. But they didn't speak up because this is the president. So, look, I think this is a unique, you know, a unique situation where the president has just much more day-to-day involvement than any of his predecessors on all areas of decision making.

18:52But those around him is pretty narrow, right? This is not a bottom-up system where you have a normal bureaucracy working through a, you know, working level to deputies, to principals to go to the president. I mean, you basically have a few select cabinet principals who are advising him. You know, Marco Rubio is obviously there, J.D. Vance, and you have the president's son-in-law, Kushner, and Wyckoff, and maybe, you know, Hexeth on military matters. But it's really small. The room, I think, is significantly smaller than anything I've ever seen before.

19:22And as you look at, you know, the New York Times reporting about the, you know, Netanyahu's pitch to Trump to go to war, that's not a new pitch. This is a pitch that's been made in some form or another for over 20 years. What I think was unique about this, though, is that even though these principals harbor, you know, real doubts about whether it would work, they're afraid to share it with the president. And so instead, they just kind of leak it out after the fact to try to clear their own name.

19:54I'm just going to hold you for one second there because the reporting in question here, this is by Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan. And in that reporting, this was in the New York Times, also in their book, they said that the CIA director, John Ratcliffe, said that the plans that Netanyahu was presenting, those plans were ridiculous. Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State National Security Advisor, also said that this was outlandish. It wouldn't go anywhere. I'm paraphrasing here.

20:24But you're suggesting that they didn't say that in the room at the time this all emerged afterwards, after the fact, and that no one really stopped the president or advised him otherwise. Yeah, I think that's right. Yeah. And so, and look, to some extent, that's fine. Every administration should decide how to make decisions. And if Trump wants a really small room of advisors, that's okay. But, you know, ultimately, you've got to be judged on the results and the results of the Iran war are, you know, I think, a failure.

20:57Now, look, the other dynamic that is kind of unique to this administration, I think, is worth mentioning, is that my perception is that Trump likes to be lobbied from the outside. And this is kind of a unique thing as well. And it's been reported on as well. He likes, you know, both outside players, as we've seen in the Iran war, the Gulf, Turkey, Israel, to make suggestions and basically pitch them on ideas. And he also, you know, takes feedback, you know, as we learned a lot from, like, Lindsey Graham, right? Lindsey Graham was very open about pitching the president on Iran plans, Ukraine and Russia, you know, Israeli normalization.

21:32So, I mean, like, you know, this is a unique way of doing business. And it's just, it's just unique to Trump. And again, I think it's fine if the results are there, but the results have not been there. And is it fair to say that Trump himself realized during the war that the results weren't there? It's widely reported that he wanted out. He was looking for some way to exit. And then you had the MOU, again, as we've been saying, flawed as it was. What I'm trying to get at with this line of questioning is what does he want now?

22:02What is he thinking now? And who are the people who might be advising him on some of the things you're describing? For example, you said earlier in this conversation that a ground invasion would be disastrous, would be as bad, if not worse, than the 2003 Iraq war. Who is saying that to him? Which advisor, with American interests in mind, is able to say those things to him?

22:29I mean, it's hard for me to totally speculate. But I mean, we know for a fact that Lindsey Graham was offering some of these suggestions in the past. And you would have to understand that, you know, Hegseth is coming up with military options. Presumably Rubio, who's very skeptical about the MOU, you know, is offering some of these options as well. And so, you know, there's pretty clear that there's a number of them who want to, who see the president's hesitation, as you mentioned, and are pushing for military. And look, I think, you asked what the president wants, I don't know, right?

23:03I think he wants out of this war, and more importantly, he doesn't want to be perceived as a loser, right? And so the MOU received a lot of flack from his right flank. You know, you have a lot of people in the Senate, you know, Tom Cotton and Ted Cruz, who are coming out against this, saying, and it was accurate, that this was worse than the Obama deal. Now, they don't have a better alternative, but, you know, there is no doubt that the, you know, that the MOU does not compare even to the deal Trump tore up. So, so for Trump, you know, I think you could probably, and he probably has been convinced that, hey, if you just put more pressure on, like, at some point, Iran will, will bend to our will and do what we want.

23:44And I just think, and so, I mean, it's to some extent, that's understandable, but I just think it's flawed thinking. You know, this is basically the same thinking that's led to 30 years of this type of, well, actually, really 47 years of policy towards Iran that if we just put a bit more pressure on the cave, but that hasn't really worked. And, you know, we've taken it to the maximalist degree in terms of, you know, economic pressure and now military pressure, and we're in no better position. So, as we're trying to decipher what Trump might want, when you were in the administration, this particular administration, a little over a year ago, and you were, you know, representing the White House in Iran negotiations, did you have a sense then of what the White House wanted, what Trump wanted?

24:32And do you imagine that that has significantly changed now? Yeah, my perception when I was in is that he wanted something historic, right? He either wanted a historic deal or something, you know, that was big and splashing. And so, to some extent, the 12-Day War provided that to him. It was this unprecedented bombing campaign that took out a big portion of Iran's nuclear program with no cost. So, I think he would have been happy with a real deal or with the war itself, but it was just something big and historic that I think he was seeking.

25:06Now, I will say, and there's been a lot of commentary that Trump was never serious about an Iran deal, the first part of the administration. I don't think that's accurate. My perception from where I sat was he was serious about it. He just knew it needed to look different than Obama's deal, and that was complicated. And, you know, ultimately, he just kind of lost focus and was fine with the 12-Day War instead.

25:31I was struck by some comments by Mark Esper last week at the Aspen Security Conference. This is Trump's defense secretary in his first term. And he said that the White House might be satisfied with two outcomes, one, that the strait has reopened without tolls being charged, two, some version of a nuclear deal to constrain Tehran's ability to build a bomb. Do you buy that? I mean, it seems like you may not, because all of this is basically the pre-war status quo. But you're also suggesting Trump wasn't quite happy with that.

26:05Well, look, I mean, the situation has changed, right? The situation has got worse. What was possible before the 12-Day War is probably not passable now, just in terms of what Iran's willing to do. I think our position over time has only gotten worse. I think Iran was willing to do a big deal, a deal that was better than the JCPOA before June of 2025. I don't think they've been willing to do that since. And part of it is what you alluded to earlier, a lack of trust. I think what Esper laid out, though, actually does make a lot of sense in some ways, right? And so I think if you can have a scenario that returns to the, really, the June 2025 status quo, right?

26:41The Strait of Hormuz is open, and the IEA is in there inspecting Iran, making sure they're not breaking out, you know, a covert attempt to break out for a nuclear weapon. That works. I mean, one, because it's infinitely better than we are right now and, you know, is not going to be easy to achieve. But also, two, then he can then claim that those two things combined with his, you know, June war last year, you know, has made it a sustainable status quo. You know, because the fact is, Iran isn't enriching right now that we know of.

27:15We can't verify it, but we don't know that they're, we don't think they're enriching. You know, so if that's the case, and the IEA is there to verify that, and Iran's got the Strait of Hormuz open, I mean, I think that's, that would be a great outcome given where we are now. Now, look, if you could roll back the clock, you know, you obviously roll back to 2025 and say, hey, we had a great situation, do something better. I mean, if you want to even go back further to when he withdrew from the JCPOA, he had the opportunity to maybe even strengthen it and broaden the scope, right? And so, I mean, the further you go back, the better the options get.

27:47They only get worse the more, you know, time goes by and we take actions that are ultimately counterproductive. But I think where Esper laid out now, it would be, you know, a good endgame.

28:02And we'll be back in a minute with more of Foreign Policy Live. Remember, you can catch these conversations live and on video on foreignpolicy.com. Subscribers get to send us questions in advance, in addition to a range of other benefits, including our magazine. Sign up.

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28:58So, there are two sides in any negotiation.

Iran's Goals

29:00You've spent time with the Iranians, of course. What is your sense of what they might see as an acceptable outcome to the conflict right now? Well, yeah, I mean, that question gets harder to define. I had an answer last week that might not work now, right? A week later after we've gone after all this civilian infrastructure, that's maybe different. But, with that caveat aside, I think they entered the war with maybe one or two clear strategic goals.

29:31The first was, I think, in their words, I heard this from, I think, a European diplomat. They didn't want to become Lebanon. They didn't want Israel going in every six months and hitting them over and over again. And this is where this was trending. I mean, there was a lot of talk prior to this war that, you know, the June 2025 war was the first Iran war. This is going to be the second. They expected, you know, this to happen every six or so months to go after Iran's capabilities, specifically their missile capabilities. So, I think goal number one is, like, to keep that from happening, right?

30:01You didn't want to have this. You don't want to have this war every six months. So, that was goal one. And I think, arguably, that may have been achieved. It's hard to say that definitively at this point, but if they emerge from this with some kind of peace deal, I can't imagine any presidents eager to go back to war with Iran. So, okay. So, I think that was goal one. I think goal two then became money, right? I mean, once it was clear they were going to, I think, survive this war and that Trump wanted out, I think they were looking for opportunities to cash in on it.

30:36They have a huge economic crisis that predates this war, that predates, you know, the June war. So, you know, they really needed to do this. They really need to do something, eventually, a deal with the U.S. that opens up, sanctions relief, and opens up their access to full oil sales. And so, you know, they want that. And then I think, you know, they, as they saw it opening, they added Lebanon, and now they've added, you know, the straight, the control of the straight. So, I mean, the list of demands have gone on and on as the war is going on.

31:07But ultimately, I think what they want is really just this idea that they're not going to be attacked again. They have access to funds that helps them survive. And now I think, you know, they've talked themselves in this corner. They need some kind of rhetorical victory, strong and straight.

31:25But ideally, I mean, and from my view, like, you know, we need to make sure that doesn't involve total interference. But, you know, some kind of verbal rhetorical, you know, control might be fine. Like there's like a coordination, you know, committee with Oman or something like that. But, yes, I think those three things are the core goals they want now. Hmm. The other dimension to this, of course, is that this war is immensely damaging for a lot of the other Gulf countries. And I'm curious, if we just zoom out a little bit, how you think that is something that Tehran is gaming out?

31:59What is it? What does it see as, you know, how much it can push very strained relations with other countries in the region? Yeah, I mean, it's a great question. Look, I mean, I think there's multiple true things happening at once here. Iran really did value their relationships with the Saudis and Emiratis, you know, before the war. I mean, so the fact that they were willing to do such drastic and, you know, really unprovoked and unjustifiable actions against the Gulf really, I think, speaks to how desperate they were and how existential the situation was from their perspective.

32:35But it comes with the cost. Right. These these are their neighbors and that's not going to change. And these are neighbors who are, you know, almost uniformly wealthier, more connected with the world and with strong relationships around the world. So, you know, you pay a significant cost, you know, when you strike the Gulf. And so I think to some extent, that's why we're seeing Iran not do that as much this time around. Right. They're not targeting, you know, regional energy infrastructure. I mean, it's possible they do that if this war continues to escalate, this restarted war.

33:10But, you know, that's not sustainable. You can't do that forever. You can't extort your neighbors forever and not expect them to, you know, ultimately like one, you know, support war against you, try to undermine you, these other things. And so I think Iran played a card, you know, that they probably can only play, you know, one or two times in terms of attacking the Gulf and then being able to get away, get away with it for the most part. But they can't do this inevitably if they want to have any kind of functioning state.

33:42If you keep doing this, you're headed towards some kind of failed state scenario because your your neighbors have a lot and might not have the same military power, but they have a lot of economic and diplomatic power that they'll use against Iran. So I think, you know, Iran survived this iteration, but I don't think they can do that continually moving forward. I'm going to take some subscriber questions.

Israel's Role

34:01This one live coming in from Mike Ruby, who wants to add in Israel to the mix, you know, because as we're talking about how Iran thinks about the United States and this particular deal, isn't it fair to say that they might have very different calculations for Israel and whether it can be constrained from attacking Iran in the future?

34:25Yeah, I mean, it's a good question. And look, I'll think about this both from a macro macro perspective. Look, I mean. The Jewish people and the Persian people have existed like for a millennia, like relatively peacefully, you know, up until the Islamic Republic. And even then, it hasn't been really just in the last couple of decades where this is taking off. So this is they share no borders. This is a war of choice, ultimately, for both Iran and Israel. And they both have chosen to go to war. And now you have a generation in both sides in Iran and Israel have been a war with each other.

34:58So I'm not going to, like, pretend this is something that's going to go away overnight. It won't. But it is fundamentally a choice. And so I guess that in lies the hope, right? I think that at some point there will be the decision, you know, if you're, you know, some populist pragmatist in Iran or Israel that just says, like, hey, this isn't worth it at some point. You know, you basically have, I guess, like the equivalent of like a Jerry Adams that says, why are we killing each other? This is not to our benefit. And frankly, until that hostility ends between Iran and Israel, there'll be some form of this conflict inevitably.

35:31OK, so, I mean, that's the long term. I think that's like the silver lining approach. The short term is yes. I mean, I think, you know, obviously Netanyahu is very focused on his own elections, you know, and I think that will take precedent. And I don't think he wants to get the president more upset with him in the short term. But I would expect, you know, no matter who wins the election in October to have a similar policy towards Iran to one that's going to be, you know, be very open to the use of force. And to some extent, yes, I think you will see some form of of conflict with Iran and Israel continue.

36:06I guess there are just but again, I just think there are risks for both sides from from Iran. You know, you're you're never going to have a normal country as long as this fight goes on. And if you're Israel, I think, you know, you have shifts in the U.S. that are real. You just have 40 U.S. senators vote against Israeli, you know, self-defense funding. I mean, there is a real cost to Israel's actions in Gaza and Iran that is ultimately undermining this like bipartisan consensus that's existed in the U.S. for for decades.

36:37So, I mean, I think, you know, if you're going to go on another war against Iran, you're going to have to have an incredibly strong justification and you're not going to be able to use the same justifications that got us into this war. So, yes, I do feel like in some level there's going to be more fighting, but I do think there are now some institutional constraints that are probably going to go stronger with time. And it really, I think, will hopefully push towards a longer term where this is just not in either side's long term interest. But, yeah, short term, it's going to be it's going to get worse before it gets better.

37:08One more subscriber question. This one's from Yasser Zahourian, and he says that neither Iran nor the United States want a full scale war, yet they both keep escalating. So what assumptions are they getting wrong about the other side as they head into this escalatory spiral? Yeah, I mean, the biggest one from the U.S. is that more pressure is going to make a difference. All right. This has been the continual theme of this entire war, but it really goes back decades. Right. Just a little bit more pressure will change Iran's calculus.

37:39So that is the biggest assumption. And I think Trump is doing this to try to reset leverage. I mean, I guess it's possible it can work. I just view it as a very high risk, low probability outcome from the U.S. And look, I think from Iran, they're also making a really, really significant strategic mistake here. They had the outlines at MOU that were very much in their favor. And I think they became too focused on, you know, securing maximum victory in the details of the MOU that they lost sight of the fact that this is like in their interest.

38:14Going back to moral war might help some of the few specific individuals with the Iranian government, especially those who want to keep fighting, but at a huge cost. I mean, we are destroying, you know, roads and bridges and rail lines that are going to cost billions of dollars to reconstruct. And I'm not sure that Iran gets that much better of a deal than what they had with MOU. That was, you know, significant. That was oil sales, potentially frozen assets, potentially some investment from the Gulf if ever played out. So, you know, I think Iran would have been better off not striking ships, even if it meant a slight reduction of their leverage.

38:51But, you know, neither side really wants to think medium or long term. I think everyone's just focused on the short term leverage. I have to confess, I also, and on this show, I thought that the MOU would hold not because it's a good one, but because both sides needed it. And even in the case of Iran's leaders, I just assumed that they may not have their people's best interests at heart. But at the very least, longer term, they have their own best interests at heart and therefore would keep going. So I was wrong there, too.

39:24But Nate, I have to ask you, as you were talking about the flawed U.S. assumption that a little bit more pressure would change how Iran thinks about its options. And as you pointed out, this is not new. Having served in government for so long, why is it that hard to change how the blob or any government, any administration thinks about this issue?

39:53I mean, it's a good question. I think a couple of things. One is it's much easier to do tactical things, right, than big term strategic, right? It's easier to think of what next tactical issue will put pressure on Iran. I mean, it's just easier when you're in government, too. What sanction will make them hurt or what weapon system can we deploy to the region as a show of force? So that's easier. I think, too, is political, right?

40:25I mean, who, and rightfully so, wants to be seen as going soft on this regime, right? They do horrible things to their people. They do horrible things to their partners in the region, or not their partners in the region, their neighbors in the region. And so, you know, I mean, it's just easy and good politics to be mean to Iran. And so that's unfortunate. And then I guess, and look, I think, and then I guess the last thing is because there's not a clear, you know, silver bullet to these issues.

40:59You know, I mean, you can outline, you know, ideas that could lead to success. Like, so you take, for instance, this, like, Saudi initiative to do, like, a regional dialogue. That's a good idea, right? You know, you have all the Arab neighbors there. You have Iran there, hypothetically Israel there. Like, this makes sense. But one, you know, Iran's not showing up. Two, like, Israel's not showing up. And then even if they were, you know, it doesn't all of a sudden make, like, you know, there's not going to be a kumbaya moment between the region. So, you know, there's just not an easy, easy solution to this.

41:31And so I think the best thing we can do is to do gradual, step-by-step improvements. And, you know, that's not a great campaign slogan. Let's, like, make things slightly better. You know, make Iran great again is a much better slogan, you know. But I think that's where we have to be. Fair enough. Last question. You've been out of government now for more than a year. And as you think about those things you were just talking about, the system as it is and how it's good politics in D.C. to bash Iran,

42:02do you think any of that is changing because of this war? Do you think as people begin to think about a government after Trump, maybe a democratic administration with new policymakers, a new class of thinkers, do you see any of this changing?

42:23Potentially, yeah. I mean, part of it is you see the movements on the right and left, right? This kind of neo-isolationist and, you know, left-wing progressive to actually having overlap on these issues is kind of fascinating, right? And so that's like a new development that I think is worth monitoring. And then I think, you know, when you're in a moment like this, or at least for me, it's kind of fascinating to look at historical comparisons, right? And so the one I like the best that I think maybe makes the most sense in the case of Iran is you look at Vietnam, right?

42:54This was a military and political disaster for us. And, you know, we completely disengaged for the country for two decades and it dropped from our national, you know, consciousness. And then two decades later in the 90s, all of a sudden, you know, Vietnam is like a completely different country. And so they still maintain their communist roots. But then, you know, they're like, you know, working with the West and having decent relationships and asking USAID to come in. And so I think there is this idea that sometimes if we have better understanding of the constraints and both the limitations of American power, we can use it more smartly.

43:32And then, you know, it's not going to happen overnight, but you can make things slightly better and then you turn around 20 years later and it might be significantly different. And I think, you know, that's happened in places like Vietnam and that might be the model in the future for somewhere like Iran. But it doesn't happen immediately.

43:50Indeed. Well, all I can say is it would help to have experts in the room. Nate, we'll have to leave it there. Thanks for joining us. Thank you for having me. Thank you for having me.

44:27We'll see you next time.

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